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CHAPTER 9
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: LIBERALISM
AND REFORM
SUMMARY







At length, the end of the Napoleonic war brought some relief from
the political tension, and a wave of constitutional and legal reform
swept away many ancient institutions which had long survived their
usefulness.
THE NEED FOR REFORM
The state of the law at the beginning of the nineteenth century has
been thus described by an eminent legal historian:
" Heart-breaking delays and ruinous costs were the lot of suitors. Justice was
dilatory, expensive, uncertain, and remote. To the rich it was a costly lottery: to
the poor a denial of right, or certain ruin. The class who profited most by its
dark mysteries were the lawyers themselves. A suitor might be reduced to beggary
or madness, but his advisers revelled in the chicane and artifice of a lifelong suit and
grew rich. Out of a multiplicity of forms and processes arose numberless fees and
well-paid offices. Many subordinate functionaries, holding sinecure or superfluous
appointments, enjoyed greater emoluments than the judges of the court; and upon
the luckless suitors, again, fell the charge of these egregious establishments. If
complaints were made, they were repelled as the promptings of ignorance: if
amendments of the law were proposed, they were resisted as innovations. To
question the perfection of English jurisprudence was to doubt the wisdom of our
ancestors ... a political heresy which could expect no toleration."l
The romantic fancy which led Blackstone to tolerate such a system,
comparing it to a picturesque old Gothic castle,2 could hardly survive
the shocks of war, and a very different point of view ushered in the great
reform movement.
JEREMY BENTHAM
The prophet of the new era was Jeremy Bentham3 (1748-1832). At
Oxford, Bentham had heard Blackstone lecture, and deemed his matter
unsound: as a young law student he had listened with admiration to
the judgments of Lord Mansfield. The publication of Blackstone's
Commentaries (1776) stirred him to fierce criticism expressed in his Frag-
ment on Government (1776), and he abandoned the professional study of
1 Sir Thomas Erskine May, ConstitutioNal History, ii. 384.
I 3 Comm. 268; cf. 4 Comm. 442 (both passages in Pound and Plucknett, Readings, 235-237).
3 For a very full discussion of Bentham, see Holdsworth, xiii. 41-133.
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law in order to devote himself to the basic principles upon which law
rests. The Principles oj Morals and Legislation (1789) proclaimed that
there should be constant, radical legislation as the mainspring of law,
and it should be directed to the end of securing the greatest happiness
of the greatest number. His faith in acts of Parliament was perhaps a
little overstated: the century since his death has revealed some of the
limitations in written constitutions and legislative enactments, but
nevertheless, the main position still stands-rules and institutions must
henceforth submit to the test of utility and be judged by their fruits,
and where reform is necessary, it must be effected in most instances by
deliberate, planned legislation. Besides providing a theoretical basis
for criticising the law and the constitution, he also entered into detailed
and vigorous discussion of practical details, as in The Rationale ojJudicial
Evidence. He was a :firm believer in codes and ever ready to offer advice.
In 1811 he offered to codify the law of the United States. The offer
was not accepted, and even Pennsylvania, which for a moment seemed
tempted by it, finally yielded to the professional interests of the lawyers.
Nevertheless Bentham's influence has been enormous, and has become
much more diffused than his writings. Many people act on his principles
who have never read a word that he wrote-and a great deal of what
he wrote is barely readable, so tortuous did his style become. It has
well been said that
.. his doctrines have become so far part of the common thought of the time that
there is hardly an educated man who does not accept as too clear for argument
truths which were invisible till Bentham pointed them out."l
Even some of the strange new words he invented have become
familiar, e.g. "international ", "utilitarian" and "codification".
From Bentham's day to our own a long line of measures has
approached nearer and nearer to his idea of "utility", reducing law
from the position of semi-religious mysticism to that of a practical branch
of the business of government with expediency as its guiding principle.
At the head of this movement comes the great Reform Act of 1832,
which brought Parliament into direct contact with public opinion-
and thereby subjected law, too, to the pressure of the same force. Three
years later the Municipal Corporations Act, 1835, abolished those curious
and venerable monuments of the middle ages and substituted a uniform
pattern of town government. It would be hard to imagine a more
spectacular break with the past than these two statutes. They were
accompanied by scores of others which abolished the accumulated
survivals of centuries. On the procedural side came the Uniformity of
Process Act, 1832, and the Civil Procedure Act of 1833 which buried
a great deal of subtle learning and abolished some hoary antiquities, such
as wager of law. A group of statutes from 1827 to 1837 made numerous
changes in the criminal law and greatly reduced the number of capital
1 T. E. Holland in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th edn.), t.V. "Bentham ".
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offences. TIlls in fact was the one subject on which the eighteenth
century had legislated incessantly and vigorously. Statutory inter-
ference with the penal law was therefore no novelty; the real change
was in the spirit. Sir Rober Peel and Lord Brougham were the promoters
of these reforms for which Sir Samuel Romilly and Sir James Mackintosh
had long struggled in the face of bitter opposition, and Peel in particular
made the capital contribution of setting up a professional police force, l
thus rendering the criminal law less savage but more certain in its opera-
tion. In the law of property no less far-reaching reforms were made;
one single year (1833) saw the Fines and Recoveries Act, the Administra-
tion of Estates Act and the Inheritance Act.2
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The end of this chapter therefore brings us from the old world
to the new, from the ruins of the Roman Empire to a crisis in another
empire thirteen centuries later. We have seen the gradual formation
of the English State under the Anglo-Saxon kings, which later was
transformed by the Norman genius and furnished with the first necessity
of government-a financial administration. Developing within that
administration we have seen the germs in the reign of Henry II of the
common law, while under his sons we begin to find the claim that law
and administration had now come to the parting of the ways, and the
text of the Great Charter lays down the principle of the supremacy of
law. Besides this internal limitation upon a powerful monarchy, we
also see the Church using considerable influence in politics, and its role
expressed in the terms of a general formula that although the State, like
the Church, may enjoy divine sanction (or at least divine tolerance),
nevertheless religion is superior to politics. It is clearly asserted that
there are things which kings cannot do, and in the middle ages there was
a papacy powerful enough in many cases to punish monarchs who
transgressed. We have seen, too, the growing weakness of law in the
fifteenth century and the rise in the sixteenth of administrative bodies
using semi-legal forms, which alone were adequate to meet the crisis
under'the Yorkists and early Tudors. When this movement had gone
too far, the Stuart dynasty was to suffer for its failure to adapt itself to
new conditions-although it is typical of English development that the
really innovating party found its main support in history, and even in
1 Of the earlier pioneers in criminal reform, one of the most interesting is the great novelist
Henry Fielding, the first stipendiary magistrate to sit at Bow Street. See B. M. Jones, Henry
Fielding, Novelist and Magistrate (London, 1933), Abundant material is collected in L.
Radzinowicz, History ofEnglish Criminal Law, vol. i (1948).
2 For the period of reform, see A. V. Dicey, LalV and Public Opinion in England (1905);
Sir Arthur Underhill, Changes in the English La/V ofReal Property (Select Essays in Anglo-American
Legal History, iii. 673). The novels of Charles Dickens are a fair picture of the unreformed
state of the law; see the entertaining lectures of Sir William Holdsworth, Dickens as a Legal
Historian (Yale University Press, 1928).
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antiquanarusm. With the Commonwealth there came a period unique
in English history and its failure was as conspicuous. The Revolution
completed the work of the Rebellion and expressed its results in a form
more nearly legitimate. The strange, but fascinating, theories of Hobbes
gave way to the reasonableness of Locke, and when a century later the
French Revolution issued a challenge to all established governments, it
was Burke who found an answer which served England and America
equally well. That answer was an appeal to history, to experience, and
to the traditional English habit of compromise and cautious reform-to
what Montesquieu might have called the spirit of the common law.
The French Revolution, the long and weary war, and the fearful
distress that followed the peace, came near to bringing disaster. Con-
temporaries felt themselves on the brink of revolution and civil war,
and if this last catastrophe was averted it may perhaps have been because
the party of privilege and conservatism was so clearly founded on senti-
ment rather than on political theory. There was no clash ofphilosophies
as there had been in the seventeenth century. Even Benthamism, in
spite of the formidable array of logic, ethics and jurisprudence which
decorated it, was at bottom as sound common sense as it was dubious
philosophy. Benthamism triumphed in spite of its technical apparatus
and became merged in the practical good sense of the commercial middle
class, avoiding the mysticism of the State as well as the mysticism of the
rights of man, just as at the present moment it seems that the political
thought which is derived from the common law will again stand aside
from the corresponding mysticisms of our own day.
